Playing a long game: Russia’s war in Ukraine passes two-year mark

A LONG GAME

On February 24, 2024, Russia’s war in Ukraine officially entered its second year. Expectations before the war of a swift Russian victory did not materialize amid strong Ukrainian resistance and aid provided to Ukraine by mostly Western nations. 

Russia has made some significant territorial gains, such as the capture of Mariupol in May 2022, and repelled a major Ukrainian counteroffensive last year. Yet, these victories have come at the cost of casualties that are not sustainable in the longer-term, while Russian territorial gains since Mariupol have largely been insignificant or reversed, as in the case of Kherson.

Further, the capture of the cities of Bakhmut and Avdivka was of questionable strategic value. While control of both cities created new options for future offensives, neither location was a major population center or regional capital; nor were they likely worth the casualties incurred.  Estimates from the British ministry of defense indicate astronomically high Russian losses which, if repeated over a longer period of time, would devastate Russia well before it could realistically defeat Ukraine. 

Among other consequences, Russia’s focus on Ukraine has meant that states in the Caucasus and Central Asia can exercise more independent foreign policy, allowing for other powers to gain influence. Additionally, the strain of the war continues to inflame internal tensions in regions populated by ethnic minorities such as Chechnya and Dagestan. 

THE GLOBAL ARENA

Since the invasion,  Moscow is increasingly unable to assert its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Moscow is the primary security guarantor in the regions, a role increasingly challenged as it stretches its military capabilities in Ukraine. In September 2022, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan fought a 6-day border conflict over territorial claims stemming from both countries’ independence from the USSR. Russia, which has military bases in both countries, seemed to abstain from action to prevent open fighting and was largely absent from mediation negotiations that ended the clashes. 

Likewise, the resumption of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2022 and 2023 showed the diminished status of Russian influence. In September 2022, Armenia triggered article 4 (the collective defense clause) of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). There was no significant Russian response. Following Azerbaijan’s full seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Armenia boycotted that year’s CSTO summit and has moved closer to the West, having conducted joint drills with the US military in September 2023, and relied on the EU as a mediator in disputes with Azerbaijan. More recently, Armenia also suspended its membership in CSTO. A reduction in the Russian presence in the region could also lead to tensions threatening the pro-Russian breakaway states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

A pressing concern for Moscow is the increasing presence of other powers in  regions once predominantly under Russian influence. Recent visits by the presidents of Germany and France to Mongolia underscore this shift. Notably, Germany and Mongolia have forged a strategic partnership, focusing on enhancing cooperation in the mining sector and Mongolia’s support for Germany’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Germany has further deepened its engagement in the region by expanding its oil trade with Kazakhstan, with an agreement reached in October 2023 to import 100,000 tonnes per month. In a similar fashion, France and Mongolia signed a 1.6 billion euro (1.73 billion USD)  deal to begin uranium mining in Mongolia to supply France’s energy needs.  Meanwhile, China has begun making significant diplomatic strides, convening its inaugural summit with leaders from Central Asian countries, with another summit scheduled for 2025.

INTERNAL STRUGGLES

Russia combines control over suppressed minorities and separatist movements with collaboration with local leaders. Ramzan Kadyrov’s tenure in Chechnya represents a major example of the tactic. 

A prolonged war with Ukraine also increases risk of insurrection or shift of policy in such territories. When reports emerged that Kadyrov was in a coma, speculation emerged as to new independence movements. Likewise, significant unrest occurred in Dagestan in protest of Russia’s partial mobilization in September 2022, with Russia disproportionately conscripting ethnic minorities.  While this strategy has placated the Russian public by sparing ethnic Russians from conscription, ongoing casualties may make a wider mobilization necessary in the coming months. Putin’s consolidation of power from Russia’s recent presidential election may offer an opportune moment for such a move. 

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Mobilizing larger portions of Russia’s military age population would also have profound economic and societal effects. Russia’s population is rapidly aging, with largely negative growth since the 1990s. In addition, the same ethnic minorities that the Kremlin relies on have the highest birth rates, potentially robbing Russia of young skilled labor in the longer-term. It has a limited population of young, military-age men whose use in the war effort spells major economic problems.  

The exodus of young military age men following the outbreak of the war and the first mobilization wave in September 2022 has also depleted much of Russia’s skilled workforce.  Although Ukraine contends with arguably more severe demographic challenges, it is engaged in an existential and defensive struggle, making capitulation unlikely, even if desired, given Ukraine’s aspirations to join the EU and NATO. According to a poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in February 2024, 73% of Ukrainians support continuing the war as long as necessary, a figure largely unchanged from 71% in May 2022. In the Russian case it is imaginable that the public could question the purpose of the war in Ukraine as they feel the effects at home from sanctions, the decreasing value of the ruble and the loss of family members to the war. Should such questions manifest themselves in open unrest, the Kremlin may find its grip on power threatened.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Moscow could opt to persist in the war, aiming to secure concessions that could be framed as a victory to both the Russian public and elites, though they would be far from initial ambitions of full conquest. However, Russia’s credibility has been marred by battlefield setbacks and diplomatic failures, complicating such efforts. Moreover, the prospect of achieving lasting peace seems remote as long as Ukraine continues to resist. While the Kremlin may be able to rely on Western support decreasing over time, a shift to long-term contracts, such as the construction of Rheinmetall’s munitions plant in Ukraine, may indicate these hopes are misplaced. Ukraine has also signed bilateral security agreements with Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Denmark, showing commitment to long-term support for Kyiv from these countries.

Continuing the conflict would likely further erode Russia’s influence in its geopolitical sphere. This erosion could occur through other potential flashpoints such as those located in the Fergana valley which hosts various enclaves of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  A Russia that is less able or willing to intervene in such disputes could ignite regional conflicts that risk spilling into Russia itself. In an extreme case, a Russia with severely depleted military capabilities could lead to a reopening of older territorial disputes. Examples include Sakhalin island with Japan, eastern Karelia with Finland, Transnistria with Moldova or areas around Vladivostok with China. While any such conflicts are very unlikely in the short to medium term, Russia’s distractions may give way to opportunism in the form of capitalizing on its weakness. The status of Kaliningrad, surrounded by EU and NATO member states, may also be in jeopardy.

In terms of internal stability, the existence of figures such as Yevgeny Prigozhin and Alexei Nalvany shows that Putin’s rule can be threatened when circumstances are rife.  Regions with separatist tendencies such as Chechnya may also exploit the circumstances surrounding Moscow’s diminishing capabilities 

As the war in Ukraine enters its third year, it is likely Russia and not Ukraine that has more to lose in a prolonged conflict. Ukraine’s Western allies may not supply enough aid for Ukraine to win the war, but their assistance may suffice to avoid losing it. Russia, meanwhile, could lose the war not through being driven out of Ukraine but through lacking the material and manpower means to continue. An inability to win the war alongside both international and domestic enemies waiting to exploit Moscow’s weakness may well force Russia into a lose-lose situation where it must sacrifice its goals in Ukraine and face repercussions that intensify the longer the war takes. While historical references often point to Russia’s capacity for prolonged warfare, the parallels with Tsarist Russia, consumed by revolution and subsequent civil war, may offer a more suitable comparison than relying solely on World War II analogies.